This reply to Erik Weber's commentary agrees that mechanisms are important for causal inference in social science, but argues that Weber makes the mistake that was the main focus of my original essay: inferring that since a problem cannot be solved without mechanisms, it can be solved with them. As it stands, this inference is invalid since the problem might be unsolvable with or without mechanisms. Any claim about the usefulness of mechanisms for some purpose requires an adequate account of how mechanisms can actually fulfill that function, which Weber has not provided with regard to the issues he discusses.
Several authors have noted that, without mechanisms, reliable casual inference in social science is often extremely difficult, if not impossible. From this observation, it is often concluded that mechanisms can significantly aid causal inference in social science. The motivation for my (2004) essay was that this conclusion does not follow, since reliable causal inference in social science might be extremely difficult or even impossible with or without mechanisms. Simply pointing out that a problem is hard to solve without mechanisms does not show that mechanisms will help. Put another way, any claim about the usefulness of mechanisms for resolving some methodological problem requires an adequate, positive account of how mechanisms can actually perform that function. In my paper, I argued that advocates of mechanisms in the social sciences had failed to provide an adequate account of how mechanisms could help resolve the problem of 1 underdetermination of causal explanations by statistical data. I also tried to develop a more satisfactory account of how mechanisms can ameliorate this problem.
In this reply, I will explain how the same point goes for Weber's discussion of extrapolation. Yes, it is true that extrapolation in social science is difficult without mechanisms, but this alone does not show that inquiries into mechanisms will facilitate extrapolation in any significant way. To show that, one needs an account of mechanisms-based extrapolation that is applicable to social science cases. In another work, 1 I develop a mechanisms approach to extrapolation that is inspired by biological examples and describe some of the difficulties for applying this account in social science.
The two main difficulties are, first, that trustworthy knowledge of mechanisms might not be available and, secondly, that the mechanisms might be altered in the new context, for instance, as a result of changes brought about by the policy intervention. I explain how these two difficulties pertain to Weber's discussion of extrapolation.
Social Mechanisms and Extrapolation
Weber describes two types of social science cases in which extrapolation is a serious concern: program evaluations and experimental economics. Weber begins by discussing evaluations of social programs by means of randomized controlled experiments and describes a study that tested whether negative income tax programs cause recipients to work less. Extrapolation is a significant issue for any experimental policy evaluation of this kind. The pilot study is typically on a smaller scale than the contemplated social policy. Moreover, the results of pilot studies might be sensitive to the particular economic and social context of the locations in which they were carried out. So, it is entirely possible that the study might fail to give an accurate indication of the effects that the program would have were it implemented. As Weber rightly points out, this extrapolation problem is not merely an issue of drawing an inference about the real world on the basis of a simplified experimental situation. The extrapolation problem would arise no matter whether the evaluation was done by means of a randomized experiment or an observational study. In either case, the problem is that the causal relationship of interest is likely to depend upon a complex set of background conditions that may, for all we know, vary across locations and times.
How should one address the challenges to extrapolation just described? One approach is to attempt to select a representative set of sites at which the program will be evaluated and then extrapolate by inductive generalization. Of course, such an inductive generalization could be qualified by ceteris paribus conditions believed to have an effect (in the present example) on the relationship between income and workforce participation.
The most important feature of this simple inductivist approach to extrapolation is that it requires little or nothing in the way in the way of detailed knowledge of underlying mechanisms. Such knowledge would enter, if at all, only in reference to the ceteris paribus conditions. For convenience, let us call this approach to extrapolation simple induction.
Weber would surely object to simple induction on the grounds that it will often result in mistaken extrapolations and would advocate a mechanisms-based approach in its place. Indeed, there can be little doubt that simple induction will often lead to mistakes.
But the relevant question is whether an approach that relies on mechanisms can do much better in the kinds of social science examples that Weber describes. On the face of it, it is not obvious that it can. First, accurate knowledge of the relevant social mechanisms will often be very difficult to obtain. For instance, for studies about the impact of negative income tax on job seeking, the relevant mechanisms would involve the effect of income level on recipients' assessments of the tradeoff between their time and additional income generated by work. Not only would such a complex relationship would be difficult to measure at the individual level, it would also be likely to vary according to cultural background, the local employment market, as well as other factors. This latter point illustrates the second challenge to a mechanisms approach to extrapolation mentioned in the introduction: the mechanisms may vary from context to context too. In fact, the implementation of the social program itself may produce unexpected changes in the mechanism. The point here is not to deny that mechanisms may be useful for extrapolation in social science. Rather, the point is that some work needs to be done to
show that a mechanisms approach will do significantly better than simple induction in the types of social science cases being discussed. Mechanisms are not a magic wand that can be waved to make methodological problems vanish. They may or may not be helpful with respect to a given problem, and it is challenge for philosophers of social science to provide adequate accounts of when they are useful and how they are useful when they are. One criterion of adequacy of any mechanism-based extrapolation in social science is that it can explain how the two difficulties described above can be overcome.
At the end of his essay, Weber sums up his argument as follows:
(1) There are contexts in which information about social mechanisms is the only source available to social scientists for arriving at causal claims. (3) and (4) are examples of the fallacy I critiqued in my (2004) paper and which I described above. It is pointed out that a problem is difficult to solve without mechanisms, and from that it is quickly concluded that mechanisms will not only sometimes but almost always yield a solution to the problem, and hence that mechanisms are almost always needed. As explained above, this not a valid inference, since the problem might be unsolvable with or without mechanisms. Some additional account is needed to show that mechanisms can solve the problem in the cases of interest, and even more would be needed to show that they almost always will do so.
In addition, I think that Weber neglects some relevant literature on causal inference from statistical data in his argument for (3). Weber points out some
shortcomings of attempting to demonstrate a causal relationship by showing that a correlation persists even when one statistically controls for every potential common cause that one can think of and measure. Yet it is known, though perhaps not known too widely, that this inferential strategy is highly suboptimal (cf. Sprites, Glymour, and 
